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In this paper, we examine whether aid proliferation hinders aid effectiveness in 
promoting economic growth. We employ a wide variety of specifications of the standard 
aid-growth regression using Roodman’s (2007a) dataset. Specifically, we include a 
donor-concentration index as a proxy for donor proliferation and the interaction term 
between aid and a donor-concentration index as additional independent variables. Our 
best empirical results are in favor of a hypothesis that aid proliferation involves a 
negative effect on economic growth of the recipient countries with proper correction for 
possible biases arising from omitted variable and endogeneity problems.   
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1.  Introduction 
James D. Wolfensohn, the former president of the World Bank, stated that Tanzania files 
2,400 reports to aid donors and hosts 1,000 aid missions from donor countries each year 
(Roodman 2006b).
1 Under such circumstances, the efficiency of official capital inflow 
can be undermined significantly. This is a situation of aid proliferation or aid 
bombardment where large numbers of donors and projects overwhelm the recipient 
government’s capacity to manage and administer aid inflows. The immediate 
consequence of aid proliferation is an increase in the transaction costs for absorbing 
foreign aid that are incurred by recipient governments (Acharya et al. 2006). More than 
twenty years ago, Morss (1984) said that “[t]he most important feature distinguishing 
foreign aid in the 1970s from earlier programmes was the proliferation of donors and 
projects.” Cassen et al. (1994) also pointed out that “aid projects are planted here and 
there in an almost haphazard way and in excessive numbers, with a variety of untoward 
consequences.” (p.175) It seems that the issue has been worsening over the past decades: 
on average, the number of donors acting in aid recipient countries has continued to 
increase during the last thirty years (Figure 1). 
 
Recently, studies have emerged which address the issue of aid proliferation such as 
Acharya et al. (2006), Knack and Rahman (2007), and Roodman (2006a, 2006b). 
Acharya et al. (2006) found that countries with the most extreme fragmentation of aid 
inflows are very likely to be aided by the worst proliferators among the donors. Given 
this environment, Knack and Rahman (2007) analyze the impact of donor fragmentation 
on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid recipient countries. Roodman (2006a) 
                                                  
1  According to Roodman (2006b), these numbers are based on a misreading of van de Walle and 
Johnston (1996) and the reality was even worse.     3
theoretically argues the proliferation of aid projects and the associated administrative 
burden for recipients. There is, however, no study which investigates the effect of aid 
proliferation on the economic performance of a recipient country as far as we know. This 
paper aims to bridge this gap by augmenting a standard cross-country growth regression 
approach for the aid effectiveness by including an aid proliferation index as an 
independent variable. 
 
Our research strategy is related to the copious existing studies on the aid and growth 
nexus spanning more than thirty years (Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Clemens 2005; 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004; Roodman 2007a; Burnside and Dollar 2000). While 
the most influential work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) shows that foreign aid improves 
the income growth of the recipient country when the country is in a healthy policy 
environment, subsequent studies such as Hansen and Tarp (2001), Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2004), and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find that the results of Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) are not robust to alternative specifications, extended data, or 
estimation methods.
2 An emerging consensus seems to be that, at best, there appears to 
be a small positive, but insignificant, impact of aid on growth (Bourguignon and 
Sundberg 2007). Yet, a common feature of these studies is their treatment of aid as being 
homogeneous regardless of its modality. Clemens (2005), which examines the effect of 
short term aid, is one of the few papers taking into account the heterogeneity of aid 
quality. Our study tries to mitigate a potential bias arising from this homogeneity 
assumption of foreign aid. 
 
                                                  
2 Since the GMM estimations of Rajan and Subramanian (2005) may have a problem of too 
many instruments because of unrestricted number of lags.   4
Our best empirical results are in favor of a hypothesis that aid proliferation involves a 
negative effect on economic growth of the recipient countries, using Roodman’s (2004) 
data with proper correction for possible endogeneity bias. The effect of aid on economic 
growth taking into account the extent of aid concentration shows an inverted U-curve, 
indicating that there is an optimal level of aid proliferation. The results also indicate that 
the larger the magnitude of aid flows, the greater the impact on economic growth in 
countries with less proliferation but with diminishing returns. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 postulates a simple model which 
gives testable theoretical implications and then specifies the econometric model. In 
Section 3, we describe the data and variables including the aid proliferation index, which 
is followed by the estimation results and robustness checks. Finally, we state concluding 
remarks in Section 4 with some policy implications. 
 
2.  A Simple Model of Aid Proliferation 
There are several possible modeling strategies in which aid proliferation undermines 
economic performance. First, aid proliferation induces competition for local experts or 
available local matching funds for aid and thus decreases the average bureaucratic quality 
and the effectiveness of aid projects, respectively, in aid recipient countries (Knack and 
Rahman 2007; Arimoto and Kono 2007). Largely speaking, aid proliferation increases 
transaction costs so that the effectiveness of aid is reduced significantly (Acharya et al. 
2006). Another possibility we focus on in this paper is the free-rider problem arising 
from the fact that aid outcomes in recipient countries are a kind of joint production by a 
wide variety of resources provided by both donor and recipient countries.   5
 
Consider the team production model of Holmstrom (1982) to determine the degree of 
efforts of donor countries in a recipient country. There are N donors (agents) that jointly 
produce a single output, g, which is, for example, the growth effect of aid or “aid 
effectiveness” in the recipient country, i.e., the partial derivative of growth with respect 
to aid inflow. The effort level of the i-th donor is denoted by ei. Therefore, the production 
technology of this group becomes: 
g = g (e1, e2, e3, ….., eN; X),      (1) 
where X is a matrix of variable which is specific to the recipient country. Let us assume 
that a donor (agent) i’s utility function is: 
ui = si – vi(ei),     (2) 
where si is the output share of donor i and vi(ei) indicates the convex disutility function of 
donor i’s effort. 
 
The efficiency regime of this economy can be solved as the following problem: 
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Note that the Pareto optimal level of effort, ei*, satisfies this FOC. On the other hand, a 
Nash equilibrium is derived by solving an individual donor’s utility maximization:   6
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marginal contribution of aid effort to aggregate economic growth. Equation (6) gives an 
individually optimal effort level, êi. The main question is whether there is a way of fully 
allocating the joint output g so that the resulting non-cooperative game among the agents 
has a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. This requires finding allocation rule si which 
satisfies the Pareto optimality condition (4) and Nash equilibrium condition (6) at the 
same time. Mathematically, we need to show the feasibility of   
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This feasibility depends on the characteristics of the output, g. If, for example, we 
assume that the individual donor’s benefit from aid effectiveness is private goods, 
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We can easily see that the requirement of Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (7) and the 
balanced budget condition (8) contradict each other if N>1. At the Nash equilibrium, an   7
agent’s effort level, êi, is smaller than that of social optimal, e i*. This is a formal 
representation of moral hazard in team production. This result indicates that in closed 
(balanced-budget) organizations, free-rider problems are likely to lead to an insufficient 
supply of productive inputs. 
 
On the other hand, if there is only one donor, i.e., N=1, equation (7) and (8) hold 
simultaneously. Moreover, as N increases, the gap between the Pareto optimal effort 
level and individually optimal effort level becomes wider. This result illustrates the 
inefficiency of aid proliferation. 
 
Also, when donors are fully altruistic and the aid effectiveness becomes a pure public 
good, the individual solution becomes socially optimal. In other words, the free-rider 
problem arises when there are multiple donors who are motivated by self-interest. 
 
3.    Data, Variables, and Baseline Estimation 
3.1    An Index of Aid Proliferation 
Our hypothesis to be tested is that aid proliferation hinders aid effectiveness and 
economic growth. Before we proceed into detailed explanation, we need to clarify the 
definition of aid proliferation. In the literature, there is no standard definition of aid 
proliferation. In order to quantify the degree of aid proliferation, we follow Knack and 
Rahman (2007) to construct a Herfindahl Index of donor concentration by summing the 
squared shares of aid over all donor agencies. Suppose that the total amount of aid 
provided to a recipient country in a certain year is represented by Q. The amount of aid 
from a donor i to this recipient is represented by qi. Then   8
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where the donor i's aid share is defined as si≡qi/Q. Let us denote the mean and variance 
of donor shares by μ and σ
2, respectively. Then, we have: 
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If all donors have identical shares, then the variance becomes zero and HI equals 1/N. 
Alternatively, if the number of donors is held constant, a higher variance will result in a 
higher index value. Hence, this index decreases when the aid proliferation becomes 
serious. 
 
We assume that an index of aid proliferation should be considered in the “gross aid” 
context because absolute gross amount of aid inflows affects efficient use of aid. Even 
small amounts of grants or concessional loans with a low grant element impose a burden 
on the absorptive capacity of recipient governments and may hinder government 
effectiveness. Similarly, net aid variables do not precisely depict the situation of aid 
proliferation. Therefore, based on the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
database, we compute the donor Herfindahl concentration index based on equation (9) as 
a proxy of aid proliferation in recipient countries.   9
 
CRS provides detailed information on each activity funded by foreign aid of OECD/DAC 
member countries.
3 We use the committed amount of bilateral and multilateral foreign 
aid by donor and year to calculate the index for each recipient.
4 The computed 
Herfindahl index ranges from 0 to 1 in which high values indicate greater donor 
concentration. As can be seen from Figure 2, the Herfindahl Index overall trend 
calculated by recipient country and denoted by regional average has been decreasing 
since 1973 and the Index for East Asian countries is found to be statistically higher than 
that of Sub-Saharan African countries.   
 
Since aid proliferation is one of the center topics in the recent aid discussion, we depict 
the situation from two viewpoints; one from regional differences and the other from 
donor differences. Our data is mostly based on ODA data in the CRS. Figure 1, as 
mentioned in the Introduction, shows the upward trend in the average number of bilateral 
DAC donors per aid recipient country during the period 1973-2002. In reality, since not 
only bilateral DAC donors but also multilateral donors, non-DAC bilateral donors such 
as China and OPEC countries,
5 and numerous NGOs exist, actual aid proliferation is 
likely to be even worse. With the increase of donors, the number of projects naturally 
increases as well. Figure 3 shows the upward trend in the average number of bilateral 
                                                  
3  CRS contains detailed information on individual aid activities of most of the 23 members of the 
OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as well as those of multilateral development 
banks and UN agencies. The whole dataset is available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/29/31753872.htm. 
4 We exclude aid activities coded as 900 in the CRS since this class of aid includes 
“administrative costs of donors” and “spending in the donor country for heightened 
awareness/interest in development co-operation” that are clearly not related to the aid 
proliferation of recipient countries. Unlike Roodman (2006a), we include aid activities for which 
the grant element is less than 25% since these aid activities bring similar administrative burden as 
aid activities with larger grant element. 
5  OPEC stands for Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.   10
DAC donors’ project per aid recipient country during the period of 1973-2002. The 
average size of the project as shown in Figure 4, which is calculated by the total aid and 
the number of projects, is consistently higher for the East Asia region compared to that of 
the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This is especially true after the mid 1980’s when they 
both are on a downward trend due to heightened aid proliferation. Figures 5 and 6 show 
the aid share of major bilateral donors in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In East Asia, 
Japan seems to be the dominant donor all the time while the aid in Sub-Saharan Africa 
mostly equally shared by numerous donors. Figures 7A through 7D show the empirical 
cumulative distribution function of the Herfindahl Index of East Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa by decades. We then use the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine if 
there are any differences in the distribution of Herfindahl Index for these two groups. The 
test results reveal that in the 1970’s there was no difference in the Herfindahl Index 
between East Asia and Sub- Saharan Africa while there emerge significant differences 
afterwards suggesting that aid proliferation in Sub-Saharan Africa is more serious. 
 
Figure 8 is the Herfindahl Index grasped from the donor differences and calculated by the 
number of recipients and the share of aid to each recipient country. They seem to be 
slightly on a downward trend. The hike of US aid in 1991 is due to the large provision of 
aid to Egypt after the Gulf War and the spike of German aid in 1992 is due to the large 
provision of aid to Poland after the collapse of Berlin Wall.
6 Figures 9A through 9E 
show the number of countries and the total amount of aid which each of the major five 
donors provides. All the donors have significantly increased the number of countries in 
which they provide aid. 
                                                  
6  The US provided 51% of bilateral aid to Egypt in 1991 and Germany provided 52% of bilateral 
aid to Poland in 1992.   11
3.2 Empirical  Strategy 
Using the above-defined donor-concentration index, we employ the data set of Roodman 
(2007a) which is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset to investigate the aid 
and growth nexus using cross-country regression. Roodman (2007a) extends the data 
compiled by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004).
7 
The resultant sample is composed of 440 observations across 67 countries for the period 
1970-2001 (Appendix Table 1). Roodman (2007a) finds that the aid-policy nexus proves 
weakest, while the aid-tropics link is most robust among a wide variety of hypotheses 
tested by Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier and Dehn (2001), Collier and Dollar (2002), 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Hansen and Tarp (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard, 
Hansen, and Tarp (2004), and Guaillaumont and Chauvet (2002). Roodman (2007a) also 
includes the variables of the proportion of tropical area (Tropicar) and the interaction 
term between aid and the tropic variable (Aid*Tropic) which were not included in the 
dataset of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004). The 
interaction term between aid and the fraction of tropical area (Aid*Tropicar) are found to 
be consistently negative and statistically significant in Roodman (2007a) indicating that, 
on average, aid works well outside the tropics but not in them. Taking the same empirical 
strategies, we add the HI-related variables to the Roodman’s (2007) dataset and employ 
semi-parametric, OLS, and system GMM estimation methods. 
 
Specifically, we postulate the following equation for the system GMM estimation:   
it t i Ex it En it it it it it Ex En Aid HI HI Growth ε α α β β α α α + + + + + × + + = ) (
2
3 2 1   (11) 
                                                  
7 The published EDA data (Chang et al. 1998), which was used in Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
cover only 1975-‘95. Roodman (2007a) extrapolate EDA to the rest of 1970-2001 via a 
regression of EDA on net ODA, which is available for the whole period.     12
where subscripts i and t denote the recipient country of foreign aid and the time period, 
respectively. The dependent variable, Growth, is per capita GDP growth rate as is 
employed by Roodman (2007a). On the right hand side, there are independent variables 
related to aid, Aid, and the Herfindahl Index, HI. The equation also includes other aid 
related variables such as aid*policy and aid*tropics. Enit denotes a matrix of other 
predetermined and endogenous variables such as initial GDP per capita, institutional 
quality, and so on and Exit represents a set of other exogenous variables such as regional 
dummy variables and ethnic fractionalization. Finally, αi, αt, and εit are country-specific 
fixed effects, year-specific effects, and a well-behaved error term, respectively. 
 
Many existing studies estimating income-growth regression on foreign aid argue possible 
endogeneity biases that aid is provided to poorer countries, or to countries after poor 
performance and in fact find that OLS estimators are very different from estimators 
correcting for endogeneity (Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Roodman 2007a; Hansen and 
Tarp 2001; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Boone 1996). Therefore, in order to correct for 
biases arising from possible correlation between the error terms and explanatory 
variables as well as omitted variables, we employ the system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).
8 The system 
GMM estimation corrects for omitted variable bias by eliminating fixed effects through 
first-differencing and for endogeneity bias using lagged endogenous regressors as 
effective instruments.
9 We test whether instruments are orthogonal to the error term 
                                                  
8 Note that using a fixed-effects model does not correct for endogeneity even if we use lagged 
variables as regressors. System GMM models are estimated by using a Stata command of 
xtabond2 developed by David Roodman.   
9 In the difference equations, predetermined and endogenous variables are instrumented with 
suitable lags of their own levels while in the levels equations they are instrumented with lags of 
their first differences. Predetermined variables are correlated with past errors and endogenous   13




In the system GMM estimations applied to Roodman (2007a) data, we assume that 
regional dummy variables, year dummy variables, measure of tropical land (Tropic), and 
measure of ethnic fractionalization (Ethnic) are exogenous and the values of these 
variables do not change over time. Also, we assume that the logarithm of initial gross 
domestic product per capita (Log of initial GDP per capita), the rate of political 
assassinations (Assassinations), the interaction term between ethnic fractionalization and 
political assassinations (Ethnic*Assassinations), and a measure of financial depth 
(M2/GDP lagged) are considered to be predetermined. All other regressors such as HI, 
HI², the interaction terms between aid and HI (Aid*HI, Aid* HI², and Aid²*HI), and other 
interaction terms of HI are considered to be endogenous. 
 
One caveat of our empirical strategy is the exogeneity assumption of institutional quality 
(Institutional Quality). The index of institutional quality is based on the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of PRS group which is available since 1982. Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) use the fixed value of ICRG index assuming that institutional factors 
change slowly over time and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) follow the same 
method though they found broader coverage from the original ICRG. Since ICRG varies 
over time, however, Roodman (2007a) assigns 1982 values to observations before 1982 
and uses varying values to reflect the real changes for the observations after 1982. We 
                                                                                                                                                    
variables are correlated with past and present errors. See Blundell and Bond (1998). 
10 System GMM reports a test of over-identifying restrictions (Hansen J statistic) which tests 
whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous and is robust to heteroscedasticity and a 
test of autocorrelations.     14
basically consider that institutional quality is endogenous in the growth regression, but it 
is not possible to take differences in the system GMM estimation if their values do not 
change over time.
11 We therefore implemented both estimations; one included ICRG as 
an endogenous regressor and the other included ICRG as an exogenous regressor 
specifying that this would be used only in the estimations of level equation along with 
other exogenous variables such as regional dummies and ethnic fractionalization. Since 
the results do not differ much, our results are based on the endogenous institutional 
quality. 
 
We limit the number of lags to one period in order to avoid a problem of excessive 
instruments in the system GMM estimations. According to Roodman (2007b), the rule of 
thumb is that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of countries in the 
regression. As the instruments become numerous relative to the sample size, they can 
overfit the instrumented variables, biasing the results toward those of OLS. It should be 
noted that the p value of the Hansen J statistic turns close to 1 when there are too many 
instruments.
12  We employ the one-step robust estimator of the system GMM.   
3.4 Estimation  Results 
We start by semi-parametric estimation of the partial linear regression model by adding 
the interaction term of aid and HI (Aid*HI) as a non-parametric variable.
13 We include 
country and period dummy variables. The results are shown as Table 1 and Figure 10. 
The non-parametric regression line is drawn as slightly mountain-shaped, suggesting that 
there may be an optimal point of HI. The significance test of the variable (Aid*HI) that 
                                                  
11  In this sense, ICRG in Roodman (2007a) is mixed with fixed values and changing values.   
12  See Roodman (2007b) for details about the system GMM 
13 The semi-parametric estimation of the partial linear regression is estimated by using a Stata 
command of plreg developed by Lokshin (2006).   15
enters the specification non-linearly indicates that the coefficient of Aid*HI is 
statistically significant (p-value of 0.02) in this specification. 
 
Next, we investigate whether foreign aid interacted with the extent of aid proliferation 
promotes economic growth using OLS and GMM estimation methods by adding the 
interaction term of aid and HI and the interaction terms of HI with other control variables 
such as Policy, Institutional Quality, and regional dummies to see the combined effect of 
aid proliferation on growth. The estimation results by OLS are presented in columns 1-3 
of Table 2. Coefficients of the following variables are found to be statistically significant 
at a 1% or 5% level and robust against specification change in the OLS; tropicar 
(negative), ssa (negative), easia (positive), icrge (positive), ram21 (negative), policy 
(positive), aid (positive), and Aid*Tropicar (negative) while the coefficients of the 
interaction terms of aid and HI turn out to all be insignificant. 
 
The GMM results change the whole picture as shown in columns 4-11 of Table 2. The p 
values of the Hansen J statistic and the Arellano-Bond statistic shown in the last two 
rows indicate that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term and that the error term 
is not auto-correlated in the system GMM estimation.
14  Since this is the case for most of 
the system GMM estimations, our discussions will rely on the GMM results, rather than 
the OLS results. Columns 4-11 of Table 2 indicate that the interaction term between aid 
and HI (Aid*HI) has a positive and significant coefficient except column 8 suggesting 
that the aid provided in a more concentrated condition (meaning “in a less proliferated 
condition”) positively impacts growth. Column 5 is our benchmark result and shows the 
interaction term between aid and squared HI (Aid*HI²) has negative and significant 
                                                  
14  We use a significance threshold of 0.05.   16
coefficient implying that the growth effect of aid using the HI function can be illustrated 
as an inverted U-shape which has an optimal point. 
 
Using the estimated coefficients, we can compute the growth facilitation effect of aid 
working through HI. The effect can be computed by a formula:  （the coefficient of Aid）
× Aid +（the coefficient of Aid*HI）× Aid*HI +（the coefficient of Aid*HI²）×
Aid*HI². Figure 11 was drawn with the estimated coefficients of column 5 evaluated at 
the sample mean level of aid. The relationship between the growth facilitation effect and 
HI emerges as an inverted U-shape with the highest point at HI=0.5. Since HI is defined 
between zero and one, the effect of aid considering aid proliferation will bring the largest 
impact at around the mid point of HI. This parametric result coincides with the 
non-parametric regression of Figure 10. It should be noted that whether the overall effect 
on growth turns out to be positive depends on the coefficients of other variables. This 
result suggests that aid proliferation indicated by a low HI hinders growth possibly due to 
high transaction costs while aid concentration indicated by an excessively high HI also 
hinders growth possibly due to less competition among donors. This benchmark result 
holds when we exclude aid*policy and aid²*policy from the regressors (column 7) and 
when we further add the aid² variable (column 10). 
 
Another implication can be obtained from column 6 of Table 2. The interaction term of 
aid squared and HI has negative and significant coefficient suggesting that the larger the 
magnitude of aid flows, the greater the impact on economic growth in countries with less 
proliferation but with diminishing returns. But this result does not hold when we exclude 
aid*policy and aid²*policy from the regressors (column 8) and when we further add the   17
aid² variable (column 11). 
3.5 Robustness  Checks 
To check the robustness of the results and to see the various effect of aid proliferation on 
growth, we experiment with several alternative specifications. Table 3 presents the GMM 
results of various estimations by adding the interaction terms of HI with other control 
variables such as Policy, Institutional Quality, and regional dummies. The coefficient of 
the interaction term between aid and HI (Aid*HI) is consistently positive and significant 
against the specification changes except for column 6 of Table 3 which is not very 
reliable since the p value of AR(2) is too low. These results are consistent with baseline 
estimations shown in Table 2 and stress the fact that aid proliferation involves a negative 
effect on the economic growth of the recipient countries. 
 
As to the optimal level of HI, the interaction term of Aid*HI² has negative and significant 
coefficient in column 4 of Table 3 following the benchmark results while the coefficients 
of Aid*HI² in columns 5 and 6 are not statistically significant. Column 6 of Table 3 is not 
considered to be reliable due to the low p value of AR(2), but there may possibly be 
multicollinearity problems as well. On the other hand, the interaction term of aid squared 
and HI has consistently negative and significant coefficient in column 7, 8, and 9, 
suggesting an aid effect on growth with diminishing returns. We also find that the 
coefficient of the regional dummy variable of East Asia appears mostly positive and 
significant (column 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 in Table 3). The interaction term between aid and 
the fraction of tropical area (Aid*Tropic) turns out to be not very robust, which is 
different from the original estimation by Roodman (2007a). 
   18
We also perform estimations with the datasets of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004). The results based on these alternative datasets did not pass 
tests of statistical significance.
15 We suspect that these results based on smaller sample 
size suffer from sample selection bias because the datasets of Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) are smaller than that of Roodman (2007a), 
(Appendix Table A1). In order to check the degree of the sample selection bias, we run a 
probit model of a binary variable which takes 1 if the sample is in the Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) sample or Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) sample and takes zero 
otherwise. The independent vectors include GDP, population, institutional quality, 
regional dummy variables, interaction terms of these variables, and some of the squared 
and cubic variables. The results are shown in Table 4. As we can see, population, tropical, 
and institutional variables have statistically significant coefficients, suggesting sample 
selection bias in the Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman 
(2004) datasets. 
 
4  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper investigates whether aid proliferation affects economic growth of recipient 
countries by incorporating a donor concentration index and related interaction terms to 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), and Roodman 
(2007a) which are the major growth regressions in the literature. Since the Roodman 
(2007a) data is the most comprehensive of the three datasets considered in this paper, we 
use it to derive baseline results. Our empirical results suggests that the effect of aid on 
economic growth taking into account the extent of aid concentration shows an inverted 
                                                  
15 These results are not reported in this paper but are available from the corresponding author 
upon request.   19
U-curve, indicating that there is an optimal level of aid proliferation. The results also 
indicate that the larger the magnitude of aid flows, the greater the positive impact on 
economic growth in countries with less proliferation but with diminishing returns. 
 
Aid coordination has become one of the most pressing issues in the current international 
aid community. As the contrast between the economic growth of East Asia and the 
stagnation of Sub-Saharan Africa emerges, public discussion regarding aid seems to 
focus on two points. On one hand, the increase of aid volume is still being emphasized, 
especially after the Monterrey consensus in 2002. However, without close examination of 
past aid effectiveness and aid modalities, it is difficult to arrive at a favorable consensus 
for increasing the amount of aid. On the other hand, the problems of aid proliferation and 
necessity of aid coordination among donors are recognized. The main point is that the 
lack of international aid coordination leads to the lack of ownership and lower capacities 
of aid recipients and hinders their growth potential. 
 
The importance of aid coordination cannot be ignored since not only the current DAC 
donors, but also the emerging donors, who are currently operating outside the 
international aid coordination framework, are soon expected to play an important role in 
the aid community. Yet, the main finding of this paper — that more aid concentration is 
likely to be correlated with higher economic growth — may or may not be consistent 
with the logic behind aid coordination. If aid coordination may act as concentration of 
aid by reducing transaction costs, then it may promote economic growth. However, if the 
problem is a free-rider problem, aid coordination does not necessarily facilitate growth. 
In the future, it will be imperative to elaborate on careful analyses of the role of aid 
coordination.   20  21
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World East Asia Sub-Sahara Africa
 
Source: CRS/OECD, Commitment Base. Calculated by recipient countries and shown as 
regional averages.   24
 






























Sub Sahara Africa 10.5  15.6  26.0  40.8  53.2  60.6  103.8  203.3 
East Asia 16.5  18.6  24.0  31.6  33.1  40.0  71.4  121.1 
South Asia 28.1  35.4  45.1  61.0  75.9  97.0  141.3  246.2 
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
 
Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base 
Note: The year shown in the table represents the starting year of four-year averages.  
Figure 4: Average Size of Project (Bilateral DAC Aid) 
Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base 
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Figure 5: Bilateral DAC Aid Share by donors (East Asia) 
Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base 
Note: The year shown in the table represents the starting year of four-year averages. 
 
Figure 6: Bilateral DAC Aid Share by donors (Sub-Saharan Africa) 
Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base 
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HI
East Asia Sub-Sahara Africa
Cumulative Distribution of HI (1970s)
 
Note: The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions cannot 
reject the equality between these two probability distributions of Herfindahl index 
(p-value is 0.277). 
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HI
East Asia Sub-Sahara Africa
Cumulative Distribution of HI (1980s)
 
Note: The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions reject 
the equality between these two probability distributions of Herfindahl index strongly 
(p-value is 0.000).     
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
HI
East Asia Sub-Sahara Africa
Cumulative Distribution of HI (1990s)
 
Note: The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions reject 
the equality between these two probability distributions of Herfindahl index strongly 
(p-value is 0.000).     
 


















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
HI
East Asia Sub-Sahara Africa
Cumulative Distribution of HI (2000s)
 
Note: The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions reject 
the equality between these two probability distributions of Herfindahl index strongly 
(p-value is 0.000).     
   28




















Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base. Calculated for five major donor countries. 
The hike for US in 1990 is due to the Gulf War and the provision of aid to Egypt. The spike for 
Germany in 1992 is due to the collapse of Berlin Wall and the provision of aid to Poland 
 














































Total Amount of aid
Number of Recipients
 
Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base.   29













































Total Amount of aid
Number of Recipients
 
Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base. 
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Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base. 
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Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base. 
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Source: CRS / OECD, Commitment Base. 
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Table 1 : Extension of Roodman (2007a) 
Semi-Parametric Estimation 
 




  (0.930) 
raethnf  0.93 
  (1.911) 
ratropicar  -1.167 
  (1.748) 
raassas  -0.02 
  (0.281) 
raethnfassas -0.006 
  (0.621) 
raicrge  0.43 
  (0.188)* 
ram21  0.005 
  (0.024) 
rassa  1.506 
  (2.868) 
raeasia  7.346 
  (2.975)* 
rapolicy1  1.109 
  (0.256)**
raaid  1.101 
  (0.532)* 
ratropaid  -0.938 
  (0.467)* 
raaidpolicy  -0.138 
  (0.165) 
raaid2policy  0.004 
  (0.022) 
HI  -3.857 
  (4.938) 
HI2  4.229 
  (4.610) 
Observations 439
R-squared  0.54 
P value  0.02 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. All variables except HI are taken from Roodman’s homepage 
[http://www.cgdev.org/content/experts/detail/2719/]. Variables including a HI index are constructed 
from CRS.   32
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Table 2 : Extension of Roodman（2007a）(1) 
Dependent Variable: per capita GDP growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
ralgdp (Pre) -04 8 9 -04 9 -05 1 6 4 144 3 993 39 3 4 316 4 233 3 796 3 982 4 107
(0.437) (0.437) (0.440) (1.493)* (1.357)* (1.371)* (1.074)** (1.079)* (1.092)* (1.036)* (1.060)*
raethnf (Ex) -0.063 -0.063 -0.053 -2.522 -2.342 -1.136 0.083 -0.192 -1.161 -1.135 -0.618
(0.701) (0.703) (0.703) (2.266) (1.963) (2.460) (1.945) (1.925) (1.968) (1.850) (2.040)
ratropicar (Ex) -1.05 -1.015 -1.059 -0.37 -0.987 -1.191 -0.048 0.263 0.26 -0.291 0.439
(0.389)* (0.400)* (0.389)* (1.242) (1.129) (1.084) (0.997) (0.946) (0.986) (1.020) (0.997)
raassas (Pre) -0.192 -0.187 -0.185 -0.606 -0.587 -0.417 -0.387 -0.383 -0.403 -0.428 -0.322
(0.210) (0.212) (0.212) (0.417) (0.400) (0.472) (0.373) (0.374) (0.371) (0.369) (0.394)
raethnfassas (Pre) -0.088 -0.098 -0.094 0.754 0.726 0.556 0.353 0.388 0.463 0.491 0.322
(0.614) (0.615) (0.612) (1.298) (1.285) (1.362) (1.175) (1.142) (1.115) (1.180) (1.192)
raicrge (En) 0.458 0.455 0.469 0.342 0.424 1.084 0.483 0.477 0.4 0.469 0.671
(0.116)* (0.116)* (0.117)* (0.454) (0.422) (0.427)* (0.368) (0.399) (0.394) (0.380) (0.391)+
ram21 (Pre) -0.031 -0.03 -0.031 -0.064 -0.064 -0.096 -0.037 -0.039 -0.017 -0.024 -0.036
(0.011)* (0.011)* (0.011)* (0.036)+ (0.031)* (0.031)* (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
raeasia (Ex) 2.254 2.258 2.203 2.941 2.528 1.843 1.668 1.757 1.192 1.159 1.239
(0.479)* (0.480)* (0.485)* (1.724)+ (1.533)+ (1.242) (1.203) (1.285) (1.305) (1.220) (1.197)
rassa (Ex) -1.319 -1.314 -1.322 1.07 1.352 1.23 0.914 0.735 1.223 1.635 1.653
(0.617)* (0.619)* (0.618)* (1.704) (1.605) (1.720) (1.218) (1.368) (1.387) (1.379) (1.408)
rapolicy1 (En) 1.02 1.011 1.072 -0.508 -0.076 0.898 0.402 0.338 0.483 0.525 0.386
(0.192)* (0.192)* (0.205)* (0.646) (0.568) (0.860) (0.362) (0.368) (0.360) (0.367) (0.385)
raaid (En) 0.779 0.936 0.804 -0.571 -2.928 -0.502 -0.559 1.067 -0.412 -3.581 -2.045
(0.319)* (0.480)+ (0.307)* (0.907) (1.649)+ (0.939) (0.960) (0.902) (1.270) (1.897)+ (1.793)
ratropaid (En) -0.879 -0.931 -0.873 -1.012 0.028 -0.364 -0.851 -1.522 -1.008 -0.032 -1.35
(0.284)* (0.310)* (0.281)* (0.755) (0.923) (0.745) (0.490)+ (0.805)+ (0.675) (0.794) (0.729)+
raaidpolicy (En) -0.006 0.004 -0.085 0.274 -0.12 -2.325
(0.111) (0.111) (0.155) (0.378) (0.362) (0.934)*
raaid2policy (En) -0.008 -0.009 0.005 0.001 0.051 0.405
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.052) (0.055) (0.158)*
HI( E n ) -3.194 -2.645 -3.265 -69.264 -72.231 -72.422 -46.301 -46.016 -49.375 -59.459 -56.661
(3.160) (3.320) (3.138) (22.074) (19.283) (21.664) (17.511)** (17.715) (16.978) (16.891) (18.772)
HI2 (En) 2.989 2.368 3.089 53.634 59.085 60.084 35.897 33.591 34.517 47.147 43.023
(3.200) (3.483) (3.178) (20.437) (19.254) (21.596) (17.628)* (16.989) (15.512) (16.843) (17.980)
raaidHI (En) 0.042 -1.034 0.496 3.168 17.231 24.937 11.201 2.691 2.204 19.447 14.887
(0.509) (2.675) (0.652) (1.350)* (7.317)* (9.826)* (6.425)+ (3.347) (1.059)* (7.268)* (8.587)+
raaidHI2 (En) 1.491 -17.335 -12.107 -20.668
(3.633) (8.381)* (7.215)+ (8.164)*
raaid2HI (En) -0.12 -4.02 -0.252 -2.284
(0.099) (1.761)* (0.602) (1.479)
raaid2 (En) 0.084 0.146 0.421
(0.073) (0.076)+ (0.246)+
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39
Hansen 0.74 0.57 0.38 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.72 0.85
AR2 0.11 0.1 0.23 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.12
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and + denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. All variables except HI are taken from Roodman’s homepage 
[http://www.cgdev.org/content/experts/detail/2719/]. The HI index is constructed by committed amounts of 
aid by bilateral donors and multilateral donors recorded in the CRS data of the OECD. Variables labeled 
(Pre) are considered to be predetermined in the system GMM estimations. Likewise variables labeled (EX) 
are considered to be exogenous and variables labeled (En) are considered to be endogenous in the system 
GMM estimations.   
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Figure 11: Effect of aid through HI 
(Based on Table 2 (5) : Roodman (2007a)’s extension) 
 
Growth facilitation effect of aid through HI =（the coefficient of Aid）×Aid +（the 
coefficient of Aid*HI）×Aid*HI+（the coefficient of Aid*HI²）× Aid*HI² 
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Table 3 : Extension of Roodman（2007a）(2) 
Dependent Variable: per capita GDP growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
ralgdp (Pre) 2 128 4 415 4 144 3 054 2 818 0 676 2 724 2 721 0 443
(1.101)+ (1.496)** (1.493)** (1.229)* (1.250)* (1.241) (1.422)+ (1.294)* (1.270)
raethnf (Ex) -0.987 -2.447 -2.522 -1.774 -1.516 -1.437 -0.425 -0.639 -0.423
(1.650) (2.269) (2.266) (1.855) (1.723) (1.646) (2.392) (2.057) (1.750)
ratropicar (Ex) -0.416 -0.139 -0.37 -1.122 -1.336 -1.557 -1.324 -1.525 -1.685
(0.868) (1.246) (1.242) (0.977) (0.828) (0.720)* (0.984) (0.881)+ (0.733)*
raassas (Pre) -0.648 -0.517 -0.606 -0.559 -0.551 -0.595 -0.375 -0.464 -0.529
(0.337)+ (0.418) (0.417) (0.376) (0.356) (0.356)+ (0.486) (0.408) (0.387)
raethnfassas 0.743 0.608 0.754 0.556 0.475 0.494 0.308 0.404 0.458
(0.947) (1.308) (1.298) (1.249) (1.227) (1.174) (1.390) (1.290) (1.173)
raicrge (En) 0.414 0.286 0.342 1.103 0.882 1.436 2.32 1.531 1.872
(0.365) (0.465) (0.454) (0.868) (0.909) (0.810)+ (1.240)+ (0.920)+ (0.806)*
ram21 (Pre) -0.042 -0.062 -0.064 -0.08 -0.07 -0.057 -0.122 -0.1 -0.078
(0.032) (0.039) (0.036)+ (0.033)* (0.033)* (0.029)+ (0.039)** (0.033)** (0.031)*
raeasia (Ex) 2.072 2.862 2.941 3.218 2.702 -4.691 3.204 2.436 -4.117
(1.431) (1.711)+ (1.724)+ (1.514)* (1.333)* (4.505) (1.652)+ (1.346)+ (4.170)
rassa (Ex) -0.09 1.079 1.07 0.469 0.434 -0.559 0.153 0.354 0.255
(1.168) (1.721) (1.704) (1.433) (1.415) (2.596) (1.437) (1.393) (2.495)
rapolicy1 (En) 0.447 -0.596 -0.508 0.117 -0.657 0.077 1.142 0.215 1.193
(0.488) (0.640) (0.646) (0.534) (1.395) (1.418) (0.861) (1.626) (1.732)
raaid (En) 0.15 0.223 -0.571 -2.512 -2.244 -1.794 -0.449 -0.339 -0.334
(0.685) (0.713) (0.907) (1.536) (1.525) (1.555) (1.015) (0.822) (0.681)
ratropaid (En) -0.907 -1.307 -1.012 -0.041 -0.111 -0.269 -0.353 -0.456 -0.494
(0.608) (0.737)+ (0.755) (0.857) (0.856) (0.788) (0.752) (0.624) (0.497)
raaidpolicy (En) 0.035 0.306 0.274 -0.14 -0.034 -0.263 -2.337 -1.858 -1.904
(0.369) (0.369) (0.378) (0.335) (0.354) (0.361) (0.857)** (1.000)+ (0.989)+
raaid2policy 0.012 -0.014 0.001 0.051 0.044 0.06 0.405 0.333 0.31
(0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.146)** (0.160)* (0.153)*
HI (En) -18.435 -70.17 -69.264 -51.528 -53.942 -28.717 -40.858 -53.189 -23.757
(5.288)** (21.005)** (22.074)** (19.639)** (16.696)** (17.499) (27.558) (18.282)** (16.772)
HI2 (En) 56.047 53.634 47.201 45.534 33.961 46.141 49.711 32
(20.365)** (20.437)** (17.297)** (14.720)** (14.872)* (19.794)* (16.266)** (13.754)*
raaidHI (En) 3.168 15.111 12.999 9.835 24.354 20.544 18.436
(1.350)* (6.812)* (6.953)+ (6.883) (8.869)** (9.532)* (8.698)*
raaidHI2 (En) -14.657 -12.725 -8.132
(8.094)+ (8.284) (8.175)
raaid2HI (En) -3.915 -3.291 -2.839
(1.634)* (1.747)+ (1.560)+
raicrgeHI (En) -1.75 -1.438 -3.81 -3.524 -2.028 -3.757
(2.001) (2.174) (2.171)+ (2.995) (2.265) (2.122)+
rapolicyHI (En) 3.421 1.498 3.411 0.999
(5.443) (5.203) (5.511) (5.606)
raeasiaHI (En) 29.698 25.364
(18.391) (16.499)
rassaHI (En) -1.276 -5.718
(11.199) (11.675)
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Hansen 0.4 0.72 0.74 0.38 0.55 0.51 0.61 0.57 0.62
AR2 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.09 0.1 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.14
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and + denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. All variables except HI are taken from Roodman’s homepage 
[http://www.cgdev.org/content/experts/detail/2719/]. The HI index is constructed by committed amounts of aid by 
bilateral donors and multilateral donors recorded in the CRS data of the OECD. Variables labeled (Pre) are considered 
to be predetermined in the system GMM estimations. Likewise variables labeled (EX) are considered to be exogenous 
and variables labeled (En) are considered to be endogenous in the system GMM estimations.     36
Table 4 : Probit Estimation of Sample Selection 
(1) (2)
  Probit Probit
Dep. Variable BD=1 ELR=1
ralgdp 14.219 -23.734
  (23.556) (31.609)
ralpop -13.633 -61.258
  (11.628) (21.085)**
rassa 0.288 -0.399
  (0.288) (0.424)
raeasia -0.115 -0.35
  (0.356) (0.430)
ratropicar 1.189 0.825
  (0.281)** (0.345)*
raicrge -0.22 -0.364
  (0.063)** (0.092)**
ralgdp2 -1.494 3.782
  (3.144) (4.274)
ralpop2 0.777 3.736
  (0.698) (1.265)**
ralgdpp op 0.096 -0.162
  (0.102) (0.165)
ralgdp3 0.043 -0.178
  (0.140) (0.188)
ralpop3 -0.015 -0.074
  (0.014) (0.025)**
Observations 319 382
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.32
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, * and + denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 







Appendix Table 1 : Summary of three extensions we estimate 
 
Estimation Countries period  Number  of 
observations 
(1) BD  56  70-93  275 
(2) ELR  62  70-97  356 
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  Appendix Table2 : Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
BD bdgdpg 275 1.173 3.599 -12.204 12.270
bdaid 275 1.625 2.069 -0.008 12.724
bdaidpolicy 275 1.616 4.867 -26.569 39.940
bdaid2policy 275 7.780 45.773 -224.543 508.196
HI_all 275 0.267 0.181 0.049 1
bdaidHI 275 0.295 0.361 -0.003 2.970
bdaid2HI 275 1.074 2.924 0.000 35.370
bdpolicyHI 275 0.302 0.376 -1.185 1.759
bdicrgeHI 275 1.244 0.972 0.171 6.089
bdssaHI 275 0.060 0.116 0 0.850
bdeasiaHI 275 0.023 0.076 0 0.533
bdlgdp 275 7.514 0.702 5.743 9.339
bdethnf 275 0.464 0.301 0 0.930
bdassas 275 0.432 1.235 0 11.500
bdethnfassas 275 0.171 0.605 0 7.360
bdssa 275 0.305 0.461 0 1
bdeasia 275 0.109 0.312 0 1
bdicrge 275 4.563 1.237 2.271 7
bdm21 275 28.664 13.278 7.235 98.387
bdpolicy 275 1.173 1.262 -4.504 4.525
ELR elrgdpg 356 1.395 3.592 -12.693 16.550
elraid 356 1.308 1.864 -4.591 12.745
elraid2policy 356 1.753 3.947 -18.556 27.808
elraidpolicy 356 7.265 30.604 -117.040 354.415
HI_all 356 0.263 0.180 0.064 1.000
elraidHI 356 0.232 0.429 -2.511 4.106
elraid2HI 356 0.905 2.807 0.000 25.251
elrpolicyHI 356 0.348 0.367 -1.246 1.604
elricrgeHI 356 1.162 0.958 0.174 6.033
elrssaHI 356 0.059 0.112 0 0.850
elreasiaHI 356 0.022 0.076 0 0.533
elrlgdp 356 7.510 0.754 5.598 9.339
elrethnf 356 0.467 0.298 0 0.9
elrassas 356 0.483 1.255 0 11.5
elrethnfas~s 356 0.185 0.596 0 7.36
elrssa 356 0.309 0.463 0 1
elreasia 356 0.098 0.298 0 1
elricrge 356 4.326 1.553 1.58 8.233
elrm21 356 26.394 14.620 4.580 120.308
elrpolicy 356 1.374 1.167 -5.345 3.725
ROODMAN ragdpg 440 1.428 3.549 -12.742 16.487
raaid 440 1.204 1.781 -4.545 12.608
raaidpolicy 440 1.637 3.524 -20.842 23.529
raaid2policy 440 6.205 25.488 -140.671 296.644
HI_all 440 0.260 0.181 0.064 1
raaidHI 440 0.206 0.388 -2.486 4.064
raaid2HI 440 0.765 2.514 0.000 24.709
raicrgeHI 440 1.212 1.170 0 8.414
rassaHI 440 0.056 0.109 0 0.850
raeasiaHI 440 0.033 0.116 0 0.952
ralgdp 440 7.528 0.785 5.224 9.711
raethnf 440 0.457 0.299 0 0.9
raassas 440 0.429 1.161 0 11.5
raethnfassas 440 0.162 0.543 0 7.36
rassa 440 0.307 0.462 0 1
raeasia 440 0.116 0.320 0 1
raicrge 440 4.435 1.749 0 10
ram21 440 28.535 16.665 4.183 120.308
rapolicy1 440 1.496 1.101 -6.021 3.607
ratropaid 440 0.993 1.590 -4.545 11.370
ratropicar 440 0.727 0.415 0 1    39
Appendix Table 3: List of Countries 
code countryname BD ELR RO BD ELR RO
ARG Argentina 6 7 8 Y Y Y
BFA Burkina Faso 4 8 Y Y
BGR Bulgaria 2 Y
BOL Bolivia 6 7 8 Y Y Y
BRA Brazil 6 5 8 Y Y Y
BWA Botswana 3 6 7 Y Y Y
CHL Chile 6 7 8 Y Y Y
CHN China 4 Y
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 1 5 6 Y Y Y
CMR Cameroon 5 6 7 Y Y Y
COG Congo, Rep. 2 3 Y Y
COL Colombia 6 7 8 Y Y Y
CRI Costa Rica 6 7 8 Y Y Y
DOM Dominican Republic 6 7 8 Y Y Y
DZA Algeria 2 1 2 Y Y Y
ECU Ecuador 6 7 8 Y Y Y
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 5 6 7 Y Y Y
ETH Ethiopia 2 4 5 Y Y Y
GAB Gabon 6 6 6 Y Y Y
GHA Ghana 6 7 7 Y Y Y
GMB Gambia, The 6 5 5 Y Y Y
GTM Guatemala 6 7 8 Y Y Y
GUY Guyana 6 1 Y Y
HND Honduras 6 7 8 Y Y Y
HTI Haiti 5 7 8 Y Y Y
HUN Hungary 3 Y
IDN Indonesia 6 7 8 Y Y Y
IND India 6 7 8 Y Y Y
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 5 6 Y Y
JAM Jamaica 3 5 6 Y Y Y
JOR Jordan 6 7 Y Y
KEN Kenya 6 7 8 Y Y Y
KOR Korea, Rep. 6 7 7 Y Y Y
LKA Sri Lanka 6 7 8 Y Y Y
MAR Morocco 6 7 8 Y Y Y
MDG Madagascar 4 5 6 Y Y Y
MEX Mexico 6 7 8 Y Y Y
MLI Mali 1 3 4 Y Y Y
MMR Myanmar 7 8 Y Y
MWI Malawi 4 4 4 Y Y Y
MYS Malaysia 6 7 8 Y Y Y
NER Niger 2 2 2 Y Y Y
NGA Nigeria 6 7 8 Y Y Y
NIC Nicaragua 6 7 8 Y Y Y
PAK Pakistan 6 7 8 Y Y Y
PER Peru 6 7 8 Y Y Y
PHL Philippines 6 7 8 Y Y Y
PNG Papua New Guinea 5 6 Y Y
POL Poland 2 Y
PRY Paraguay 6 6 8 Y Y Y
ROM Romania 2 Y
SEN Senegal 4 4 6 Y Y Y
SGP Singapore 8 Y
SLE Sierra Leone 6 7 8 Y Y Y
SLV El Salvador 6 7 8 Y Y Y
SOM Somalia 2 Y
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 5 6 7 Y Y Y
TGO Togo 4 6 7 Y Y Y
THA Thailand 6 7 8 Y Y Y
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 5 7 4 Y Y Y
TUN Tunisia 3 4 8 Y Y Y
TUR Turkey 1 7 8 Y Y Y
TZA Tanzania 2 Y
UGA Uganda 4 5 Y Y
URY Uruguay 6 7 8 Y Y Y
VEN Venezuela, RB 6 7 8 Y Y Y
ZAF South Africa 1 3 Y Y
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 5 7 8 Y Y Y
ZMB Zambia 6 3 7 Y Y Y
ZWE Zimbabwe 3 5 5 Y Y Y
Total 275 356 440 56 62 67
Freq. in the Obs. List of countries
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Appendix Table 4 : Description of Variables 
Variable  Code  Original data source Notes 
Per-capita GDP growth  gdpg  World Bank, 2003 
Initial GDP per capita  lgdp  Summers and 
Heston, 1991 
Natural logarithm of 
GDP/capita for first year of 
period; constant 1985 dollars
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization  ethnf  Roeder, 2001  Probability that two 
individuals will belong to 
different ethnic groups 
Tropical area fraction  tropicar Gallup abd Sachs,  
1999 
Assassinations/capita  assas  Banks, 2002 
Institutional quality  icrg  PRS Group's IRIS 
Ⅲdataset (see 
Knack and Keefer, 
1995) 
Revised version of variable. 
Computed as the average of 
the three components still 
reported after 1997 
M2/GDP, lagged one period  m21  World Bank, 2003 
Sub-Saharan Africa  ssa  World Bank, 2003 
East Asia  easia  Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) 
Dummy for China, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand, 
following Burnside and Dollar
Aid (Effective Development 
Assistance)/PPP GDP 
aid  Chang et al., 1998; 
DAC, 2002; IMF, 
2003; World Bank, 
2003; Summer and 
Heston, 1991 
Available values for 1975-95 
from Chang et al. Missing 
values extrapolated based on 
the regression of EDA on Net 
ODA. Converted to 1985 
dollars with World Import 
Unit Value index from IMF, 
series 75. GDP computed 
like LGDP above 
Policy index  policy  Roodman, 2004    
Population  lpop  World Bank, 2003  Natural logarithm 
Herfindahl index  HI  CRS 
Note:  All variables except HI are taken from Roodman’s homepage 
[http://www.cgdev.org/content/experts/detail/2719/]. The HI index is constructed by committed amounts of aid by 
bilateral donors and multilateral donors recorded in the CRS data of the OECD. Prefixes, such as bd-, elr-, and ra- are 
added to codes corresponding dataset of Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), Roodman 
(2007a) respectively. 